Critics have long argued that the current Medicare method of physician reimbursement "overpays" certain surgical procedures. 1 Frequently cited examples are coronary artery bypass graft surgery and lens procedures, for which technological improvements are believed to have greatly reduced physicians' time and effort. The "usual, customary, and reasonable" (UCR) method used to set payment levels provides no mechanism for readjusting physician reimbursement levels to reflect changes in production costs. Moreover, the UCR approach assumes that the initially set rates were equitable, an assumption that increasingly is being called into question.
A fundamental solution would be major reform of the reimbursement system that changes the basic financial incentives facing physicians through options such as capitation. Another option is to simply reduce payment levels for those procedures believed to be overpaid. Federal policymakers have already opted for this latter approach, starting with cataract surgery. 2 To establish that a procedure is, in fact, overpaid, we need a yardstick by which to compare its relative value to that of other services. Relative values constructed from historically determined physicians' charges are inadequate because they incorporate the existing market distortions. 3 Relative values based on actual resource costs are more likely to provide an equitable basis for comparison. Such a resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) was developed initially by Hsiao and Stason, and then refined by Hsiao and Braun. 4 This RBRVS takes into account not only the time and complexity of the medical service, but also the associated practice costs and required specialty training. Our study uses resourcebased relative values to compare current Medicare payment rates for selected surgical procedures with rates suggested by their resource costs.
Study Methods
Two sources of data were used for this analysis: Medicare physician claims and the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) values developed by Hsiao and Braun. 5 Medicare Part B (physician) claims were obtained for 1984 from four states: Alabama, Connecticut, Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen to represent the four main geographic regions of the country and, most importantly, because they all used the American Medical Association's Current Procedural Terminology-Fourth Edition (CPT-4) coding system for physicians' services. Reasonable charges were calcu lated for each procedure as a weighted average for the four states.
The RBRVS originally developed by Hsiao and Stason defines the resource inputs to physician services as the combination of: (1) time, including not only the time to perform the procedure itself, but also the time associated with pre-and postoperative care; (2) complexity, an estimate of the diagnostic and technical skills required to perform the procedure, the physical and mental intensity of the effort, and the degree of stress due to risk to the patient; (3) opportunity costs of specialty training, the amortized value of the opportunity costs associated with residency; and (4) physician practice costs, including malpractice premiums as well as rent, wages, equipment, and so on. 6 Adjustment for the complexity of the procedure recognizes that an hour of a physician's time performing delicate neurosurgery is not equivalent to the same physician hour spent in routine office visits or in a standard operation such as varicose vein stripping. Although the estimates of relative complexity were derived from subjective self-reports by physicians, Hsiao and Stason found them remarkably consistent among physicians in a given specialty.
The Hsiao and Braun study extended this original work by including a wider range of procedures and data from a larger sample of physicians. The RBRVS values used in this article were taken directly from Hsiao and Braun, except for the one-stage procedure for lens extraction and intraocular lens insertion, which was not included in their study. 7 To transform reasonable charges into payments reflecting resource values, we first selected one procedure to serve as the base or index value. Typically, a routine office visit has been used for this purpose. We chose not to do this for two reasons: first, the greatest criticism of the RBRVS has been the reliability of comparisons between surgical and nonsurgical procedures; and second, the scope, content, and payment level for office visits vary significantly by specialty. Instead, we chose cholecystectomy (surgical removal of the gall bladder) without common duct exploration as the index procedure. Although any selection is arbitrary, we chose cholecystectomy because it is a common operation for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients, is generally an elective procedure, and represents a stable technology. The potential payment under an RBRVS is then calculated for each procedure as the cholecystectomy charge times the ratio of the RBRVS value for the procedure in question to that for cholecystectomy.
Results
Potential Medicare payments under a resource-based RVS. Exhibit 1 compares 1984 Medicare reasonable charges for thirty-one surgical procedures with what their payments would be under the resource-based RVS. These procedures were chosen to represent high-volume Medicare operations and a range of surgical specialties. Other operations evaluated in the Hsiao-Braun study were not included either because of insufficient observations in our claims data or because they could not be precisely matched with CPT-4 procedure codes.
All but six of the surgical procedures examined are overpaid relative to the RBRVS. Resource-based payments for mastectomy, lung lobectomy, tracheostomy, and cystourethroscopy (endoscopic inspection of the bladder and urethra) would increase slightly over current levels, while those for esophagogastrectomy and total cystectomy with urinary diversion would increase 22 and 78 percent, respectively. Under the resource-based approach, charge levels for pacemaker insertion would be reduced by 39 percent, coronary artery bypass graft surgery by 33 percent, a one-stage lens procedure by 63 percent, and total hip replacement by 45 percent. "Roll-backs" of similar magnitude would take place for several other high-volume, high-dollar Medicare procedures.
Some newer, more technology-intensive procedures appear to be paid more relative to their resource costs than other procedures performed by the same specialty. For example, coronary artery bypass graft surgery involving three arteries is only 8 percent more resource-intensive than is mitral valve replacement, but is reimbursed at a rate 36 percent higher. Similarly, scleral buckling for retinal detachment is 79 percent more "costly" to perform than are one-stage lens procedures, but ophthalmologists are actually paid less for it.
Sensitivity of RBRVS payments to the choice of index procedure. The potential changes in payment levels shown in Exhibit 1 were based on the use of cholecystectomy as the index procedure. How sensitive are our results to our choice of index procedure? Exhibit 2 compares results using two other surgical operations as index procedures: inguinal hernia repair and lung lobectomy. Inguinal hernia repair was selected because it Percent reductions in payment levels would be considerably less if hernia repair were used as the index instead of cholecystectomy, and payments for three procedures -femoral fracture, lung lobectomy, and cholecystectomy itself-would actually increase compared to current Medicare allowed charges. Allowed charges for all other procedures would be reduced. Pacemakers would be paid 17 percent less than currently, coronary artery bypass grafts 9 percent less, and one-stage lens procedures 50 percent less. The use of lung lobectomy as an index procedure would produce resource-based payments virtually identical to those based on cholecystectomy.
While the magnitude of change in payment levels will vary as a function of the index procedure selected, the direction of payment change is generally consistent. Regardless of the index procedure used, prostatectomies (both transurethral and suprapubic), hip replacements, pacemaker insertions, coronary bypass graft surgery, and lens procedures all appear to be substantially overpaid. These surgeries alone account for 17 percent of all operations performed on the elderly. tion should be reduced 28 percent and coronary artery bypass graft surgery by 20 percent, while current reimbursement levels for insertion of intra-aortic balloon pump seem about right, and those for lung lobectomy and tracheostomy may be relatively lower.
The two most frequent Medicare operations, prostatectomies and lens procedures, appear to be substantially overpaid, based on specialtyspecific index procedures. Resource-based payments for transurethral removal of the prostate, relative to ureterolithotomy (surgical removal of a stone lodged in a ureter), imply a 19 percent reduction from current Medicare payment levels, and those for one-stage lens procedures would be lowered by 34 percent when indexed to laser photocoagulation.
Interestingly, several complex procedures appear to be underpaid. An RBRVS for ophthalmologists would increase reimbursement for scleral buckling by 9 percent, while one for urologists would more than double payments for a complete cystectomy with urinary diversion.
Implications For Medicare Policy
Our results suggest that the Medicare program is paying physicians considerably more for many operations than their resource costs would justify. Included among these overpaid procedures are such high-volume Medicare operations as lens procedures, coronary artery bypass grafts, pacemaker insertions, transurethral removal of the prostate, and total hip replacements. Although we studied only selected procedures, these account for over one-fourth of surgery performed on the elderly. 9 Thus, reducing payments for even some of these operations could yield important cost savings for Medicare. Furthermore, our results may actually underestimate the absolute magnitude of potential payment changes for several reasons. First, calculation of the resource-based payments is based on the premise that the index procedures are reimbursed appropriately. To the extent that surgery is generally overpaid, our resource-based payments are too high and the percent reductions too low. Second, no adjustments have been made in the Medicare reasonable charges shown to account for two-physician surgeries. A second surgeon, billing separately as either a "team" physician or an assistant, was found to be present in 43 percent of the coronary artery bypass graft operations, 13 percent of pacemaker insertions, and 47 percent of lens procedures in our four states. In these cases, actual total surgical charges are substantially higher. Third, the RBRVS values produced by Hsiao and Braun assume that a single surgeon performs the entire procedure and delivers all pre-and postoperative care. Their definition of resource costs includes the opportunity cost of specialty training and assumes that a fully qualified surgeon is personally involved throughout the time period. To the extent that residents or nonphysician technicians substitute for the surgeon, RBRVS values will be overstated.
Perhaps more important than these technical issues is a major conceptual limitation of the RBRVS. Resource costs, even if accurately calculated, are incomplete measures of the value of physician services. Expected health benefits to the patient also need to be included in the definition of relative values.
Impact on physicians and patients. For physicians who perform substantial numbers of these high-volume procedures on Medicare beneficiaries, fee reductions could have important effects on income. Even if reimbursement for other eye surgery remained unchanged, for example, ophthalmologists in the four study states would face potential reductions of 25 to 35 percent in their Medicare receipts.
Even more important for policymakers to recognize, however, is the potential impact of payment reductions on beneficiaries themselves. As long as assignment is optional, beneficiaries will be unprotected from potentially large increases in out-of-pocket liability. For example, the patient undergoing a lens procedure currently must pay $289 (20 percent coinsurance on the average bill of $1,444) if the ophthalmologist accepts assignment, and more if not. Under resource-based payment, the beneficiary's cost sharing would be reduced to $106 (0.20 times $529), but the potential nonassigned liability would be enormous, $915 ($1,444 minus $529), for a total out-of-pocket payment of $1,021. Of course, we do not know how many ophthalmologists would refuse assignment and actually bill the patient for the difference, nor do we know how many patients would be willing and able to pay such a sum. Nevertheless, substantial disruptions in medical care could occur in the short run, unless beneficiaries are protected.
Impact on delivery systems. To minimize effects on beneficiaries, financial incentives could be offered to physicians to sign Medicare Participating Physician Agreements by setting higher allowed charges for participating physicians. The absolutely large volume of many of these surgical procedures, coupled with Medicare's large market share, suggests that a preferred provider arrangement might also be an appropriate solution. Medicare could set fee levels and establish a list of preferred providers willing to accept that fee as payment-in-full. Beneficiaries then would be required to use those providers in order to receive Part B coverage for the procedure, but would be protected from excessive balance billing liability.
The potential Medicare savings our analyses suggest must be considered tentative in view of the relatively early stage of development of the resource-based RVS. The values derived by Hsiao and Braun are based on estimates provided by a relatively small number of physicians from one state. However, this fact will bias the results only if time estimates or perceived complexity are different in Massachusetts than in other parts of the country. There is no reason to believe this is the case, although certainly national data would be preferable. More important is the number of physicians involved in the study; larger and more representative sample sizes would give more confidence in the stability of the time and complexity estimates, particularly within individual specialties.
Physician payment reform is inevitable in the face of widespread concern over the inflationary effects of the UCR formula and the incentives it creates for overuse of many procedures. Capitation, salaried arrangements for physicians, and a revised fee-for-service system are all contenders. Ultimately, society is interested not only in the relative values of medical services but in the relative values, and hence annual incomes, of internists, general surgeons, cardiovascular surgeons, and ophthalmologists. Prices of individual services provide the building blocks upon which annual physician incomes are based. Hence, a relative value scale ultimately will be as important to salary determinations under health maintenance organizations and other group practice arrangements as it will under fee-for-service reimbursement.
